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Investment Regulations and Defined Contribution Pensions
Pablo Antolin Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Gerhard F. Scheuenstuhl affiliation not provided to SSRN Sandra Blome affiliation not provided to SSRN David Karim affiliation not provided to SSRN Stéphanie Payet affiliation not provided to SSRN Juan Yermo Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) July 1, 2009 OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 37 Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of different quantitative approaches to regulate investment risk on the retirement income stemming from defined contribution (DC) pension plans. It looks at how such regulations affect the spectrum of investment policies available and, through this channel, how they affect the retirement income that an individual may expect from a DC pension plan. The analysis shows that there is a trade-off between potential retirement income and protection from bad outcomes. Reducing the downside risk on retirement income from DC pension plans requires moving into relatively conservative investment policies where the share of assets allocated to bonds may be quite large. However, this comes at the cost of renouncing potentially higher replacement rates that are attainable but at a higher risk of unfavourable retirement income outcomes. Less risk adverse regulators and supervisors would aim at lower probability requirements as regard the downside risk, which will increase the range of investment policies available and thus the share of riskier assets.
Keywords: investment, regulations, defined contribution pension plans, retirement income, replacement JEL Classifications: D14, D91, E21, G11, G38, J14, J26 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: September 15, 2009 ; Last revised: September 15, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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