Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473275
 
 

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Letter to the SEC on Money Market Fund Reform


Jeffrey N. Gordon


Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

September 9, 2009

Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 352

Abstract:     
In the wake of the near-calamitous run on Money Market Funds during last fall’s financial meltdown that produced, among other things, an emergency Treasury deposit guarantee program, the SEC has recently proposed a modest set of reforms. The reform package aims to improve the quality of MMF portfolio securities, shorten maturities, enhance portfolio liquidity, and provide a smoother resolution process for occasions when an MMF has “busted the buck.” The Comment Letter argues that the SEC has failed to grapple with the fundamental problems with MMFs revealed by last fall’s financial crisis and, in the main, its proposals will exacerbate systemic fragility, not reduce it. It is widely appreciated that MMF holders receive an unpaid-for benefit through an implicit, if imperfect, government guarantee of their accrued balances. The flaw with the SEC’s approach is that the regulatory effort to substitute for explicit deposit insurance and to limit the implicit subsidy through restrictions on MMF portfolios adds systemic risk to financial intermediation by heightening the pressure on short-term money markets in the critical function of maturity transformation. This flaw turns out to be fundamental and requires a rethinking of the general MMF framework.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

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Date posted: September 14, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Jeffrey N., Letter to the SEC on Money Market Fund Reform (September 9, 2009). Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 352. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473275 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1473275

Contact Information

Jeffrey N. Gordon (Contact Author)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
Ctr. for Law and Economic Studies
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-2316 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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