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Does the NBA Still Have 'Market Power'? Exploring the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global Market for Men’s Basketball Player Labor


Marc Edelman


Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York; Fordham University School of Law

June 7, 2011

Rutgers Law Journal Vol. 41, No. 3, p. 549, 2010

Abstract:     
This article examines whether, based on the recent globalization of the men’s basketball player market, a court today could find NBA teams to compete, in an antitrust sense, in an international market for men’s professional basketball labor.

Part I of this article discusses how antitrust law applies to professional sports leagues, and explains why a sports league such as the NBA might seek to argue, from an antitrust perspective, that its players are part of an international labor market. Part II discusses the history of professional basketball in both the U.S. and abroad. Part III describes the differences between the NBA and foreign basketball leagues, and charts player movement between U.S. and foreign leagues. Finally, Part IV explores whether, based on information provided in Parts II and III of this Article, a court could reasonably find there to be an international market for premier men’s basketball labor.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Antitrust, Sherman Act, Collusion, Section 1, sports, sports law, market power, basketball, market definition, geographic market, labor market, labor

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Date posted: September 24, 2009 ; Last revised: June 9, 2011

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc, Does the NBA Still Have 'Market Power'? Exploring the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global Market for Men’s Basketball Player Labor (June 7, 2011). Rutgers Law Journal Vol. 41, No. 3, p. 549, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473493

Contact Information

Marc Edelman (Contact Author)
Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York ( email )
One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
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