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An Empirical Look at Atkins vs. Virginia and its Application in Capital Cases
John H. Blume Cornell Law School Sheri Lynn Johnson Cornell Law School Christopher Seeds Cornell University - School of Law Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-021 Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 76, 2009 Abstract: In Atkins vs. Virginia, the Supreme Court declared that evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment prohibit the death penalty for individuals with intellectual disability (formerly, "mental retardation"). Both supporters and opponents of the categorical exemption, however, have criticized the Atkins opinion. The Atkins dissent, for example, urged that the decision would open the gates of litigation to a flood of frivolous claims. Another prominent criticism, heard from those more supportive of the Court's ruling, has been that the language the Court used communicating that states must "generally conform" to the clinical definitions of mental retardation is ambiguous enough to permit states to stray from the clinical definitions and, consequently, for death eligibility to vary depending upon the jurisdiction in which a defendant is charged. This Article presents preliminary data responsive to these issues, and reports three basic findings. First, Atkins has not opened floodgates of non-meritorious litigation. Second, the success rates for Atkins claims vary dramatically between states and state deviations from the clinical definitions appear to have a palpable impact. Third, as compared to their representation on death row, African-American defendants both file and win a disproportionately high number of Atkins claims. Accepted Paper Series Date posted: September 15, 2009 ; Last revised: October 12, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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