Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474390
 
 

References (54)



 
 

Citations (16)



 


 



Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections


Paul E. Fischer


University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

Jeffrey Gramlich


Carson College of Business

Brian P. Miller


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting

Hal D. White


Penn State University

September 15, 2009

Journal of Accounting & Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers. In addition, firms with low vote approval are more likely to experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and better received acquisitions, and more and better received divestitures in the future. These findings hold after controlling for other variables reflecting or determining investor perceptions, suggesting that elections not only inform as a summary statistic, but incrementally inform as well.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Director Voting, Performance Measurement

JEL Classification: G34, M40


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Date posted: September 18, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Fischer, Paul E. and Gramlich, Jeffrey and Miller, Brian P. and White, Hal D., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections (September 15, 2009). Journal of Accounting & Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474390

Contact Information

Paul E. Fischer
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Jeffrey Gramlich
Carson College of Business ( email )
Wilson Rd.
College of Business
Pullman, WA 99164
United States
HOME PAGE: http://https://business.wsu.edu/research-faculty/institutes/hoops-institute/
Brian P. Miller (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting ( email )
1309 E. 10th Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-2606 (Phone)

Hal D. White
Penn State University ( email )
210 Business Building
Smeal College of Business
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States
814-863-7055 (Phone)
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