Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474994
 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Mixed Source


Ramon Casadesus-Masanell


Harvard University - Strategy Unit

Gaston Llanes


Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

September 16, 2009

NET Institute Working Paper No. 09-06

Abstract:     
We study competitive interaction between profit-maximizing firms that sell software and complementary goods or services. In addition to tactical price competition, we allow firms to compete through business model reconfigurations. We consider three business models: the proprietary model (where all software modules offered by the firm are proprietary), the open source model (where all modules are open source), and the mixed source model (where a few modules are open). When a firm opens one of its modules, users can access and improve the source code. At the same time, however, opening a module sets up an open source (free) competitor. This hampers the firm's ability to capture value. We analyze three competitive situations: monopoly, commercial firm vs. non-profit open source project, and duopoly. We show that: (i) firms may become "more closed" in response to competition from an outside open source project; (ii) firms are more likely to open substitute, rather than complementary, modules to existing open source projects; (iii) when the products of two competing firms are similar in quality, firms differentiate through choosing different business models; and (iv) low-quality firms are generally more prone to opening some of their technologies than firms with high-quality products.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: Open Source, User Innovation, Business Models, Complementarity, Vertical Di erentiation, Value Creation, Value Capture

JEL Classification: O31, L17, D43

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Date posted: September 22, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon and Llanes, Gaston, Mixed Source (September 16, 2009). NET Institute Working Paper No. 09-06. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474994 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1474994

Contact Information

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Strategy Unit ( email )
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-496-0176 (Phone)
617-496-5859 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/rmasanell
Gaston Llanes
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile ( email )
Vicuna Mackenna 4860
Santiago
Chile
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