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Why the iPhone Won't Last Forever and What the Government Should Do to Promote its Successor

Robert W. Hahn
University of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University

Hal J. Singer
Empiris LLC


September 1, 2009


Abstract:     
Because of the overwhelming, positive response to the iPhone as compared to other smart phones, exclusive agreements between handset makers and wireless carriers have come under increasing scrutiny by regulators and lawmakers. In this paper, we document the myriad revolutions that have occurred in the mobile handset market over the past twenty years. Although casual observers have often claimed that a particular innovation was here to stay, they commonly are proven wrong by unforeseen developments in this fast-changing marketplace. We argue that exclusive agreements can play an important role in helping to ensure that another must-have device will soon come along that will supplant the iPhone, and generate large benefits for consumers. These agreements, which encourage risk taking, increase choice, and frequently lower prices, should be applauded by the government. In contrast, government regulation that would require forced sharing of a successful break-through technology is likely to stifle innovation and hurt consumer welfare.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 23, 2009 ; Last revised: October 11, 2009

Suggested Citation

Hahn, Robert W. and Singer, Hal J., Why the iPhone Won't Last Forever and What the Government Should Do to Promote its Successor (September 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477042


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Contact Information

Hal J. Singer (Contact Author)
Empiris LLC ( email )
2100 M St. NW
Suite 604
Washington, DC 20037
United States
202-747-3611 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.empiris.com
Robert W. Hahn
University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )
Oxford United Kingdom
Georgetown University
Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy
Washington, DC 20057
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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