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How the Theory of Dialectical Antitrust Perceives the Role of Competition Authorities

Oles Andriychuk
European University Institute; University of East Anglia - Centre for Competition Policy


September 24, 2009

ICC Global Antitrust Review, No. 2, 2009

Abstract:     
Competition policy and law play a pivotal role in the development of the European market process. This role, however, becomes subject to revision in the time of recession. Historically each period of economic downturn is accompanied by severe critique and substantial limitation of the principles of free market with undistorted competition. Crisis cartels and similar otherwise restrictive practices often become not only tolerated but even encouraged by the regulators. This compromise is seen as an inevitable trade-off between competition and other legitimate societal goals, such as industrial growth, social stability, total welfare and sometimes even national security. On the other hand, each regulatory ‘turbulence,’ which is caused by the revision of the role of competition within the markets, can be also seen as a fruitful time for introducing new elements to the competition policy itself and testing new theories of competition. Dialectical antitrust is one of these theories. This article explores the role of competition authorities in the period of economic crisis applying methodological apparatus of the theory of dialectical antitrust.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 25, 2009 ; Last revised: September 25, 2009

Suggested Citation

Andriychuk, Oles, How the Theory of Dialectical Antitrust Perceives the Role of Competition Authorities (September 24, 2009). ICC Global Antitrust Review, No. 2, 2009 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477835


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Contact Information

Oles Andriychuk (Contact Author)
European University Institute ( email )
Villa Schifanoia
133 via Bocaccio
Firenze (Florence) 50014
Italy
University of East Anglia - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom
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