Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478810
 
 

Citations



 


 



Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies


Henrik Cronqvist


China Europe International Business School (CEIBS)

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach


Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute

October 2009

The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 10, pp. 3941-3976, 2009

Abstract:     
We analyze the effects of heterogeneity across large shareholders, using a new blockholder-firm panel dataset in which we can track all unique blockholders among large public firms in the United States. We find statistically significant and economically important blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies. We also find blockholder fixed effects in firm performance measures, and differences in corporate policies are systematically related to differences in firm performance. We study potential sources of the heterogeneity and find that blockholders with a larger block size, board membership, direct management involvement, or with a single decision maker are associated with larger effects on corporate policies and firm performance.

Keywords: G31, G32, G34, G35

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: September 28, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Cronqvist, Henrik and Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies (October 2009). The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 10, pp. 3941-3976, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478810 or http://dx.doi.org/hhn093

Contact Information

Henrik Cronqvist (Contact Author)
China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) ( email )
699 Hongfeng Road, Pudong
Shanghai, 201206
China
+86 21-2890-5653 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/henrikcronqvist/
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )
Quartier UNIL-Dorigny
Extranef 211
1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland
++41-21-693-0098 (Phone)
++41-21-693-3010 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sfi.epfl.ch/fahlenbrach.html
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

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