Can There Be a Religion of Reasons? A Response to Leiter's Circular Conception of Religious Belief
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw
Suffolk University Law School
September 27, 2009
Journal of Law and Religion, Forthcoming
Suffolk University Law School Research Paper Series, 09-46
This is a comment on a definition of religion recently proffered by Brian Leiter in support of different conclusions we ought to draw with respect to religion. His analysis is ultimately circular: the problem with religion is that it is not science. Exposing the circularity requires identifying the trick, which is that he employs an appeal to common sense to distinguish religion and science. Nevertheless, the very belief in common sense is the same as the religion Leiter attacks: it is categorical and insulated from further reasons. My argument in response has three major themes. (1) The argument based on receptiveness to reasons and evidence itself arbitrarily picks and chooses reasons and evidence. (2) It is possible to posit a religion whose categorical demands on action and requirements of foundational bedrock are minimal. (3) Religion uses reason (in the sense of concepts apart from evidence) to grapple with the source of our bedrock beliefs. It differs from other such grappling only in degree and not kind of thought; once we accept the role of concept (or reason) in such work, religious or secular, we necessarily must accord bedrock status (or categoricity) to at least one concept. Finally, I suggest that adoption of Leiter's definition has a troubling implication as to our respect for personhood.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16
Keywords: religion, common sense, tolerance, respect, Quine, reasons, evidence
JEL Classification: K1
Date posted: September 27, 2009 ; Last revised: June 12, 2010
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