Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices
Sebastian G. Kessing
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung (WZB) - Market Processes and Governance; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2789
Random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re-election of politicians and can reduce accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: accountability, federalism, decentralization, retrospective voting, Condorcet Jury Theorem
JEL Classification: H73, D72working papers series
Date posted: September 28, 2009
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.625 seconds