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Marshallian Money, Welfare and Side-Payments


Cheng-Zhong Qin


University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics

Lloyd S. Shapley


University of California at Los Angeles

Martin Shubik


Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

September 28, 2009

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1729

Abstract:     
A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is "enough money" in the system, if it is "well distributed" the new game will be a SP game. This game can also be related to a pure NSP game where a set of default parameters have been introduced. These parameters play a role similar to the parameters specifying the interpersonal comparisons in the side-payment game. We study this game for the properties of the delta-core and consider both the conditions for the uniqueness of competitive equilibria and a new approach to the second welfare theorem. A discussion of the relationship between market games and strategic market games is also noted.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: delta-core, enough money, market games

JEL Classification: C71, C72, D51, E4

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Date posted: September 28, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Qin, Cheng-Zhong, Shapley, Lloyd S. and Shubik, Martin, Marshallian Money, Welfare and Side-Payments (September 28, 2009). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1729. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1479667 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1479667

Contact Information

Cheng-Zhong Qin
University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics ( email )
2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States
Lloyd S. Shapley
University of California at Los Angeles ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-4418 (Phone)
Martin Shubik (Contact Author)
Yale University - School of Management ( email )
Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3694 (Phone)
203-432-6167 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/d_shubik.htm
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