Slouching Towards Equality
Christopher J. Peters
University of Baltimore - School of Law
Iowa Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, 1999
Drawing on his work in two previous articles, Christopher Peters contends that uncertainty about substantive moral norms cannot justify a presumption of equal treatment. Arguments for equal treatment in the face of uncertainty are types of consequentialist claims; they are not claims of what Peters calls prescriptive equality, that is, for treating likes alike merely because they are alike. Peters contends that the consequentialist case for equal treatment as a response to uncertainty fails in two respects. First, it fails to demonstrate that equal treatment is likely to be a more satisfactory response to moral uncertainty than unequal treatment. Second, it is logically incoherent because it simultaneously relies upon and denies the possibility of confidence in moral judgment. Peters concludes that no valid case can be made for defaulting to equal treatment in the face of moral uncertainty.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
Keywords: moral norms, equal treatment, prescriptive equality, consequentialist claims, moral uncertainty, unequal treatment, nonegalitarian justice, epistemic asymmetry
JEL Classification: K19, K39
Date posted: October 1, 2009
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