New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
September 1, 2011
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
We analyze government interventions to recapitalize a banking sector that restricts lending to firms because of debt overhang. We find that the efficient recapitalization program injects capital against preferred stock plus warrants and conditions implementation on sufficient bank participation. Preferred stock plus warrants reduces opportunistic participation by banks that do not require recapitalization, while conditional implementation limits free riding by banks that benefit from lower credit risk because of other banks' participation. Efficient recapitalization is profitable if the benefits of lower aggregate credit risk exceed the cost of implicit transfers to bank debt holders.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 56
Date posted: October 6, 2009 ; Last revised: August 9, 2012
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.250 seconds