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Serial Acquirer Bidding: An Empirical Test of the Learning Hypothesis


Nihat Aktas


Skema Business School

Eric De Bodt


Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Richard Roll


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area

July 7, 10

Paris December 2009 Finance International Meeting AFFI - EUROFIDAI
Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Recent academic studies indicate that acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) decline from deal to deal in acquisitions programs. Does this pattern suggest hubristic CEO behaviors are significant enough to influence average CAR patterns during acquisitions programs? An alternative explanation is CEO learning. This study therefore tests for learning using successive acquisitions of large U.S. public targets undertaken by U.S. acquirers. A dynamic framework reveals that both rational and hubristic CEOs take on average investor reactions to their previous deals into account and adjust their bidding behavior accordingly. These results are consistent with a learning hypothesis.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Acquisitions program, Learning, Hubris, Bid premium

JEL Classification: G34

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Date posted: October 7, 2009 ; Last revised: October 23, 2010

Suggested Citation

Aktas, Nihat, De Bodt, Eric and Roll, Richard W., Serial Acquirer Bidding: An Empirical Test of the Learning Hypothesis (July 7, 10). Paris December 2009 Finance International Meeting AFFI - EUROFIDAI; Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1483595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1483595

Contact Information

Nihat Aktas (Contact Author)
Skema Business School ( email )
Avenue Willy Brandt
EURAILLE (Lille), 59777
France
Eric De Bodt
Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
1 place Déliot, BP381
59020 Lille Cedex
France
+03 20 90 74 77 (Phone)
+03 20 90 77 02 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.edebodt.net
Richard W. Roll
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-6118 (Phone)
310-206-8404 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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