Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1484224
 
 

References (35)



 


 



Game Theory for Playing Games: Sophistication in a Negative-Externality Experiment


John M. Spraggon


University of Massachusetts at Amherst - College of Natural Resources & the Environment - Department of Resource Economics

Robert J. Oxoby


University of Calgary - Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)


Economic Inquiry, Vol. 47, Issue 3, pp. 467-481, July 2009

Abstract:     
We explore the extent to which the lack of Nash payoff maximization in experimental games is attributable to the “sophistication” of participants (i.e., their understanding of strategic decision making and profit-maximizing decisions). To this end, we compare the behaviors of sophisticated participants (i.e., those who have been exposed to the concepts of game theory) against those of a more standard subject pool in a moral hazard environment. Results suggest that sophisticated subjects are significantly more likely to adopt strategies predicted by standard theory and arrive at a Nash equilibrium.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D63, D64

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: October 8, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Spraggon, John M. and Oxoby, Robert J., Game Theory for Playing Games: Sophistication in a Negative-Externality Experiment. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 47, Issue 3, pp. 467-481, July 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1484224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00146.x

Contact Information

John M. Spraggon (Contact Author)
University of Massachusetts at Amherst - College of Natural Resources & the Environment - Department of Resource Economics ( email )
Stockbridge Hall
80 Campus Center Way
Amherst, MA 01003-9246
United States
Robert J. Oxoby
University of Calgary - Economics ( email )
2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada
403-220-2586 (Phone)
403-282-5262 (Fax)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
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References:  35

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