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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486043
 
 

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Going Once, Going Twice, Reported!


Jeroen Hinloopen


University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Sander Onderstal


University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

April 5, 2013

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 09-085/1

Abstract:     
We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditional antitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniency program). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel deterrence, cartel stability, cartel recidivism, and winning bids. In FP, traditional antitrust policy deters cartel formation, destabilizes cartels, reduces the probability that a cartel re-establishes, and reduces the average winning bid. In contrast, while a leniency program has no additional effect on cartel formation or cartel recidivism, it makes cartels more stable and reduces the winning cartel bid.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: Leniency Programs, Auctions, Cartels, Laboratory Experiments

JEL Classification: C92, D44, L41

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Date posted: October 10, 2009 ; Last revised: April 15, 2013

Suggested Citation

Hinloopen, Jeroen and Onderstal, Sander, Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! (April 5, 2013). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 09-085/1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486043 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486043

Contact Information

Jeroen Hinloopen (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 42 52 (Phone)
+31 20 525 42 54 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/io/jhinloopen
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Sander Onderstal
University of Amsterdam ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
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