Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486862
 
 

References (39)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining


Sylvain Bourjade


École Supérieure de Commerce (ESC) de Toulouse

Patrick Rey


University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Paul Seabright


University of Toulouse I - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 57, Issue 3, pp. 372-409, September 2009

Abstract:     
We study the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We develop a model of litigation and settlement with asymmetric information. We show that screening liable from non-liable defendants requires the Court to restrict the rules governing admissible evidence. We study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of private litigation in antitrust enforcement and prove that increasing damages is better than reducing costs of initiating suits. We also find large benefits from introducing a system of compensation for defendants found non-liable, paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: October 13, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Bourjade, Sylvain and Rey, Patrick and Seabright, Paul, Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining. The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 57, Issue 3, pp. 372-409, September 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00383.x

Contact Information

Sylvain Bourjade (Contact Author)
École Supérieure de Commerce (ESC) de Toulouse ( email )
20, bd Lascrosses - BP 7010
Toulouse Cedex 7, 31068
France
Patrick Rey
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )
Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France
(33) (0) 5 61 12 86 40 (Phone)
(33) (0) 5 61 12 86 37 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Paul Seabright
University of Toulouse I - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) ( email )
Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allee de Brienne bat. F
Toulouse Cedex, F-31000
France
+33 5 61 12 86 17 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 86 37 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 352
Downloads: 3
References:  39
Citations:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.234 seconds