Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487782
 


 



Competition in Product Design: An Experiment Exploring Innovation Behavior


Uwe Cantner


Friedrich Schiller University Jena

Werner Guth


Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Andreas Nicklisch


Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Torsten Weiland


Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics


Metroeconomica, Vol. 60, Issue 4, pp. 724-752, November 2009

Abstract:     
We experimentally investigate competition for innovations in a patent race scenario. Pairs of subjects compete as seller firms on a duopoly market, investing in risky search. Successful innovations resulting thereof are rewarded via temporary monopoly rents. Classifying investor types reveals that most of them invest according to objective investment criteria, such as probability of search success and cash flow, as well as to non-pecuniary criteria, such as intensity of competition and relative performance. For a minority, however, no such correlation is ascertained.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: October 13, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Cantner, Uwe and Guth, Werner and Nicklisch, Andreas and Weiland, Torsten, Competition in Product Design: An Experiment Exploring Innovation Behavior. Metroeconomica, Vol. 60, Issue 4, pp. 724-752, November 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487782 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2009.04057.x

Contact Information

Uwe Cantner
Friedrich Schiller University Jena ( email )
Fuerstengraben 1
Jena, Thuringa 07743
Germany
Werner Güth
Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )
Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Andreas Nicklisch
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
49 228 9141679 (Phone)
49 228 9141655 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/nicklisch.html

Torsten Weiland
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )
Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 180
Downloads: 2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.438 seconds