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Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace


Josse Delfgaauw


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Robert Dur


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Joeri Sol


University of Amsterdam

Willem Verbeke


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)


IZA Discussion Paper No. 4395

Abstract:     
We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: sales contests, field experiment, gender differences, competition, awards

JEL Classification: C93, J16, M52

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Date posted: October 15, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Delfgaauw, Josse, Dur, Robert, Sol, Joeri and Verbeke, Willem, Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4395. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1489218

Contact Information

Josse Delfgaauw (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Robert Dur
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )
FEW / H 8-15
P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31-10-4082159 (Phone)
+31-10-4089161 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur
Tinbergen Institute
Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Joeri Sol
University of Amsterdam ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands
Willem Verbeke
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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