Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
University of Amsterdam
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)
IZA Discussion Paper No. 4395
We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31
Keywords: sales contests, field experiment, gender differences, competition, awards
JEL Classification: C93, J16, M52working papers series
Date posted: October 15, 2009
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