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Imperfect Property Rights


James E. Bessen


Boston University - School of Law; Research on Innovation

October 16, 2009

Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 09-46

Abstract:     
In theory, property rights allow markets to achieve Pareto optimal allocations. But the literature on contracting largely ignores what happens when property rights are imperfectly defined and enforced. Although some models include weak enforcement or poorly defined rights or "anticommons," this paper develops a general model that includes all of these possibilities. I find that combinations matter: Policy prescriptions to remedy individual imperfections are sometimes inappropriate under other conditions. For example, stronger penalties for violating rights can decrease Pareto efficiency, contrary to a common view. Also, collective rights organizations, such as patent pools, sometimes worsen problems of overlapping claims.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: property, markets, externalities, contract enforcement, regulation

JEL Classification: K11, K42, L14, L51

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Date posted: October 19, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Bessen, James E., Imperfect Property Rights (October 16, 2009). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 09-46. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1489880 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1489880

Contact Information

James E. Bessen (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
Research on Innovation ( email )
202 High Head Rd.
Harpswell, ME 04079
United States
617-531-2092 (Phone)
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