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Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games

Daron Acemoglu
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Georgy Egorov
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Konstantin Sonin
New Economic School; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

October 16, 2009

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 09-26

Abstract:
We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make offers to several players. We establish existence of these equilibria in finite and infinite (for MTHPE) games, provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria, and clarify the relationship between the two concepts. Finally, we show how these concepts can be applied in a dynamic model of endogenous club formation.

Keywords: voting, agenda-setting games, Markov trembling-hand perfect equilibrium

JEL Classifications: D72, C73

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 19, 2009 ; Last revised: October 19, 2009

Suggested Citation

Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games (October 16, 2009). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 09-26. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1490164

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Contact Information

Daron Acemoglu (Contact Author) Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email ) 50 Memorial Drive Room E52-380b Cambridge, MA 02142 United States 617-253-1927 (Phone) 617-253-1330 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 90-98 Goswell Road London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
Georgy Egorov Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email ) 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 United States
Konstantin Sonin New Economic School ( email ) 47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt 117418 Moscow Russia HOME PAGE: http://www.nes.ru/~ksonin/english.htm
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email ) 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 90-98 Goswell Road London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom

Abstract

Date posted: October 19, 2009 ; Last revised: October 19, 2009

Suggested Citation

Contact Information

Daron Acemoglu (Contact Author)

Georgy Egorov

Konstantin Sonin