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Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort


Luciana Echazu


Clarkson University

Nuno M. Garoupa


University of Illinois College of Law

October 1, 2009

American Law and Economics Review, 2010
U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-027

Abstract:     
We consider the distortions that corruption generates in law enforcement. Corruption dilutes deterrence, and hence the government needs to adjust law enforcement activities appropriately. We argue that this distortion is not the only one taking place. A misalignment of goals between the government and the enforcers results in another set of agency costs by which activities that put enforcers in direct contact with criminals increase at the cost of other law enforcement activities. The paper discusses the implications of both distortions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: corruption, fine, enforcer

JEL Classification: K4

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Date posted: October 19, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Echazu, Luciana and Garoupa, Nuno M., Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort (October 1, 2009). American Law and Economics Review, 2010; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-027. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491212

Contact Information

Luciana Echazu
Clarkson University ( email )
Potsdam, NY 13699-5780
United States
315-268-6456 (Phone)
Nuno M. Garoupa (Contact Author)
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
HOME PAGE: http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/
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