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Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans


Doug Chung


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Thomas J. Steenburgh


University of Virginia - Darden Graduate School of Business

K. Sudhir


Yale University - Cowles Foundation; Yale School of Managemnet

October 18, 2010

Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 1491283

Abstract:     
We estimate a dynamic structural model of sales force response to a bonus based compensation plan. The paper has two main methodological innovations: First, we implement empirically the method proposed by Arcidiacono and Miller (2010) to accommodate unobserved latent class heterogeneity with a computationally light two-step estimator. Second, the bonus setting helps estimate discount factors in a dynamic structural model using field data. This is because, quarterly and annual bonuses help generate the instruments necessary to identify both discount factors in a hyperbolic discounting model.

Substantively, the paper sheds insights on how different elements of the compensation plan enhance productivity. We find clear evidence that: (1) bonuses enhance productivity; (2) overachievement commissions help sustain the high productivity of the best performers even after attaining quotas; and (3) sales people exhibit present bias consistent with hyperbolic discounting. Given such present bias, frequent quarterly bonuses tied to high demand end-of-quarter months, serve as pacers to keep the sales force on track to achieve their annual sales quotas.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Sales Force Compensation, Productivity, Structural Dynamic Model

JEL Classification: L23, L14

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Date posted: October 19, 2009 ; Last revised: November 23, 2010

Suggested Citation

Chung, Doug, Steenburgh, Thomas J. and Sudhir, K., Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans (October 18, 2010). Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 1491283. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491283 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491283

Contact Information

Doug Chung
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Thomas J. Steenburgh
University of Virginia - Darden Graduate School of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
K. Sudhir (Contact Author)
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Yale School of Managemnet ( email )
135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-3289 (Phone)
203-432-3003 (Fax)

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