Dynamics of Networks: If Everyone Strives for Structural Holes
Utrecht University - Department of Sociology/ICS; Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)
Arnout Van de Rijt
SUNY Stony Brook
September 1, 2008
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 114, pp. 371-407
When entrepreneurs enter structural holes in networks, they can exploit the related benefits. Evidence for these benefits has steadily accumulated. The authors ask whether those who strive for such structural advantages can maintain them if others follow their example. Burt speculates that they cannot, but a formal demonstration of this speculation is lacking. Using a game theoretic model of network formation, the authors characterize the networks that emerge when everyone strives for structural holes. They find that the predominant stable networks distribute benefits evenly, confirming that no one is able to maintain a structural advantage in the long run.
Keywords: network formation, structural holes, game theory
JEL Classification: C72Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 23, 2009
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.250 seconds