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Commitment ContractsGharad BryanYale University Dean S. KarlanYale University Scott NelsonMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics October 23, 2009 Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 73 Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 980 Abstract: We review the theoretical and empirical literature on commitment devices. A commitment device is any arrangement, entered into by an individual, with the aim of making it easier to fulfill his or her own future plans. We argue that there is growing empirical evidence supporting the proposition that people demand commitment devices and that these devices can change behavior. We highlight the importance of further research exploring soft commitments - those involving only psychological costs - and the welfare consequences of hard commitments - those involving actual costs - especially in the presence of bounded rationality.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38 Keywords: Consumer/household economics, institutional and behavioral economics JEL Classification: D03, D14 working papers seriesDate posted: October 26, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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