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The Hollow Corporation Revisited: Can Governance Mechanisms Substitute for Technical Expertise in Managing Buyer-Supplier Relationships?


Anne E. Parmigiani


University of Oregon

Will Mitchell


Duke University

October 20, 2009

European Management Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper considers how a firm's system of exchange skills including internal technical expertise and supplier governance mechanisms influence supplier performance, both independently and jointly. The core question is whether inter-firm governance mechanisms, including both relational and contractual mechanisms, can substitute for a firm’s internal technical skills in maintaining supplier performance or, alternatively, whether a firm risks hollowing itself out by de-emphasizing internal expertise when it outsources. The arguments build on the capabilities, inter-organizational governance, and supply management literature. We find that internal technical expertise influences multiple dimensions of supplier performance, including cooperation, price, quality, delivery, and communication, while relational governance also affects supplier performance though in a more focused way. In turn, combinations of technical expertise, relational governance, and contractual agreements jointly affect supplier performance. Thus, firms generate superior supplier performance if they retain internal technical skills as well as increase their use of external governance mechanisms to manage buyer-supplier relationships.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: supply management, purchasing, buyer-supplier relationship, technology management, resource based view

JEL Classification: D23

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: October 27, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Parmigiani, Anne E. and Mitchell, Will, The Hollow Corporation Revisited: Can Governance Mechanisms Substitute for Technical Expertise in Managing Buyer-Supplier Relationships? (October 20, 2009). European Management Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1494477

Contact Information

Anne E. Parmigiani (Contact Author)
University of Oregon ( email )
1280 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
United States
Will Mitchell
Duke University ( email )
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
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