Coalition Formation in Straddling Stock Fisheries: A Partition Function Approach
University of Algarve
University of Helsinki
International Game Theory Review, Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp. 303-317, 2008
In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assuming ex ante symmetric players and the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the game is characterized by positive externalities - the merger of coalitions increases the payoffs of players who belong to other coalitions. A key result is that, apart from the case of two players, the grand coalition is not a Nash equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, in the case of three or more players the only Nash equilibrium coalition structure is the one formed by singletons. The results indicate that the prospects of cooperation in straddling stock fisheries are low if players can free ride cooperative agreements. Thus, in order to protect cooperation, under the aegis of regional fishery management organizations, unregulated fishing must be prevented.
Keywords: Coalition, partition function, externalities, bioeconomic model, straddling fish stock
JEL Classification: C72, Q22Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 30, 2009
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