Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496157
 


 



Cartelizing Groups in Dynamic Linear Oligopoly with Antitrust Threshold


Akio Matsumoto


Chuo University

Ugo Merlone


University of Turin - Department of Psychology

Ferenc Szidarovszky


University of Arizona - Department of Systems & Industrial Engineering (SIE)

December 2008

International Game Theory Review, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 399-419, 2008

Abstract:     
The effects of partially cooperating firms are examined in N-firm oligopolies. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is assumed to detect the violation of the antitrust regulation by the firms, and based on this assumption a piece-wise differentiable dynamic system can be developed. The firms stop cooperating if this index becomes larger than a certain threshold and they restart or continue cooperating otherwise. The equilibria of the dynamic system are first determined. Local and global asymptotic stability of the equilibria are then investigated showing the complexity of the dynamic behavior of the system.

Keywords: Oligopolies, partial cooperation, shareholding interlocks, antitrust regulation

JEL Classification: C71

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: October 31, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Matsumoto, Akio and Merlone, Ugo and Szidarovszky, Ferenc, Cartelizing Groups in Dynamic Linear Oligopoly with Antitrust Threshold (December 2008). International Game Theory Review, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 399-419, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496157

Contact Information

Akio Matsumoto (Contact Author)
Chuo University ( email )
2nd floor Blg 4 Tampa Campus
742-1 Higashinakano, Hachioji
Tokyo 192-03
Japan
Ugo Merlone
University of Turin - Department of Psychology ( email )
Via Verdi 10
Torino, I 10124
Italy
Ferenc Szidarovszky
University of Arizona - Department of Systems & Industrial Engineering (SIE) ( email )
Tucson, AZ
United States
520-621-6557 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


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