Abstract

 


 



How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis


F. Scott Kieff


George Washington University - Law School; Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Henry E. Smith


Harvard Law School


REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY CHANGES WE CAN AFFORD, Terry L. Anderson and Richard Sousa, eds., Hoover Institution Press, 2009
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 384
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-02
GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 482

Abstract:     
This short essay written for a broad audience addresses the problems that are at the center of current debates in academic and policy circles about the patent system. Most current patent reform proposals are designed to give officials and courts more power to weaken or eliminate ‘‘unworthy’’ patents and take primary aim at so-called patent trolls. This essay argues that in light of the rapid, and excessive, changes that have already occurred in the courts, what patent law needs is a tweaking of existing safety valves and processes - not opening the floodgates to more discretion and uncertainty.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: patent, innovation

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Date posted: October 31, 2009 ; Last revised: March 12, 2013

Suggested Citation

Kieff, F. Scott and Smith, Henry E., How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis. REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY CHANGES WE CAN AFFORD, Terry L. Anderson and Richard Sousa, eds., Hoover Institution Press, 2009; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 384; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-02; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 482. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496990

Contact Information

F. Scott Kieff (Contact Author)
George Washington University - Law School ( email )
2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4644 (Phone)
Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )
434 Galvez Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-3678 (Phone)
Henry E. Smith
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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