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A Contest Model of a Professional Sports League with Two-Sided Markets


Helmut M. Dietl


University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Tobias Duschl


University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Egon P. Franck


University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Markus Lang


University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW)

November 15, 2010

University of Zurich - Institute for Strategy and Business Economics - Working Paper No. 114

Abstract:     
This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externalities by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a contest model. In professional team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform that enables sponsors to interact with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive network effects operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while positive or negative network effects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. Clubs react to these network effects by charging higher (lower) prices to sponsors (fans). The size of these network effects also determines the level of competitive balance within the league. We further show that clubs benefit from stronger combined network effects through higher profits and that network externalities can mitigate the negative effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance. Finally, we derive implications for improving competitive balance by taking advantage of network externalities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Competitive balance, contest, multisided market, network externalities, team sports league

JEL Classification: L11, L13, L83, M21

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Date posted: November 7, 2009 ; Last revised: November 16, 2010

Suggested Citation

Dietl, Helmut M., Duschl, Tobias, Franck, Egon P. and Lang, Markus, A Contest Model of a Professional Sports League with Two-Sided Markets (November 15, 2010). University of Zurich - Institute for Strategy and Business Economics - Working Paper No. 114. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1500228 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1500228

Contact Information

Helmut M. Dietl
University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )
Hottingerstrasse 10
Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland
Tobias Duschl
University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )
Hottingerstrasse 10
Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland
Egon P. Franck
University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )
Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich 8032
Switzerland
+41 1 634 28 45 (Phone)
Markus Lang (Contact Author)
University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )
Hottingerstrasse 10
Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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