Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation

Abstract:     
This essay details a model of capital structure and financial equilibrium, developed in order to provide more theoretical information about informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Although direct information transfer about the abilities of the entrepreneur and/or the quality of the firm is uncertain, one publicly available signal is investment in the project by the entrepreneur. This model demonstrates how a firm's value increases with the share of the firm shared by the entrepreneur, and a firm's financial structure can be related to a project or firm's value. Other models cannot readily account for the presence of financial intermediaries, in part because they do not incorporate the role of asymmetric information -- with this model, financial intermediation (which provides a validation role for the credibility of information and has a means of recouping the cost of information gathering and legitimation) can be interpreted as a response to asymmetric information. Within this model, it is determined that the set of investment projects undertaken coincides with the set that would be undertaken if direct information transfer were possible. (CBS)

Keywords: Signaling, Inside ownership, Information assessment, Intermediaries, Capital structure, Information asymmetry

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