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GATT Art. XV: Exchange Arrangements


Andrew D. Mitchell


University of Melbourne - Melbourne Law School

Elizabeth Sheargold


Melbourne Law School

July 29, 2010

MAX PLANCK COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, Vol. 5, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, eds., Koninklijke Brill NV, 2009
Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 1507253

Abstract:     
This is a commentary on GATT Article XV: Exchange Arrangements. These exchange agreements are the multilateral rules on currency exchange systems that are administered by the IMF and codified in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, as well as arrangements that may be made between the WTO and one of its Members if that is not also a member of the IMF (a “special exchange agreement”). Art. XV GATT is the “cornerstone” of the relationship between the IMF and the WTO, setting out the basis for co-operation between the two organisations. The purpose of the article is to give the reader a comprehensive and concise insight into the meaning of GATT Article XV.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: GATT Article XV, Exchange Agreements, Exchange Controls and Trade Restrictions, The WTO and the IMF

JEL Classification: F13, F33

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Date posted: November 17, 2009 ; Last revised: July 30, 2010

Suggested Citation

Mitchell, Andrew D. and Sheargold, Elizabeth, GATT Art. XV: Exchange Arrangements (July 29, 2010). MAX PLANCK COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW, Vol. 5, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, eds., Koninklijke Brill NV, 2009 ; Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 1507253. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507253

Contact Information

Andrew D. Mitchell (Contact Author)
University of Melbourne - Melbourne Law School ( email )
The University of Melbourne
Victoria, 3010
Australia
+61383441098 (Phone)
+61393472392 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/Andrew%20Mitchell
Elizabeth Sheargold
Melbourne Law School ( email )
Victoria, 3010
Australia
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