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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507305
 
 

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Virtual Worlds as a New Game Theoretic Model for International Law:
The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties


Peter Jenkins


York University - Osgoode Hall Law School

April 15, 2009

SCRIPTed, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009

Abstract:     
Game theoretic analysis of international law has traditionally revolved around the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a model developed during the Cold War that reflects the general unenforceability of international agreements. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are, however, enforceable and require a different approach. The current global economic crisis will exacerbate the controversies concerning the broad powers exercised by the arbitrators appointed under BITs. It is thus imperative to explore a viable new game theoretic model, which can be provided by virtual worlds such as Second Life and World of Warcraft.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Virtual worlds, Prisoner's Dilemma, Game Theory, Bilateral Investment Treaties, End-User Licensing Agreement

JEL Classification: C70, F21

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Date posted: November 16, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Jenkins, Peter, Virtual Worlds as a New Game Theoretic Model for International Law: The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties (April 15, 2009). SCRIPTed, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507305

Contact Information

Peter Jenkins (Contact Author)
York University - Osgoode Hall Law School ( email )
4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
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