Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507498
 
 

References (32)



 


 



The Political Economy of Redistribution in the U.S. In the Aftermath of World War II and the Delayed Impacts of the Great Depression - Evidence and Theory


Roel M. W. J. Beetsma


University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); Netspar

Alex Cukierman


Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Massimo Giuliodori


University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE); Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA)

October 2009

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7501

Abstract:     
The paper presents evidence of an upward ratchet in transfers and taxes in the U.S. around World-War II. This finding is explained within a political-economy framework involving an executive who sets defense spending and the median voter in the population who interacts with a (richer) agenda setter in Congress in setting redistribution. While the setter managed to cap redistribution in the pre-war period, the War itself pushed up the status-quo tax burden, raising the bargaining power of the median voter as defense spending receded. This raised the equilibrium level of redistribution. The higher share of post-War transfers may thus be interpreted as a delayed fulfilment of a, not fully satisfied, popular demand for redistribution inherited from the Great Depression.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: agenda setter, ratchets, redistribution, taxes, transfers, World-War II

JEL Classification: E62, E65, N11, N12

working papers series





Date posted: November 17, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. and Cukierman, Alex and Giuliodori, Massimo, The Political Economy of Redistribution in the U.S. In the Aftermath of World War II and the Delayed Impacts of the Great Depression - Evidence and Theory (October 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7501. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507498

Contact Information

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM) ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 525 5280 (Phone)
+31 20 525 4254 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
Netspar ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Alex Cukierman
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 540 5360 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah ( email )
P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel
HOME PAGE: http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Massimo Giuliodori
University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE) ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 387
Downloads: 2
References:  32

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.515 seconds