Abstract

 
 

References (21)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Law and Science as Forms of Inquiry: Toward a Comparison of Legal and Scientific Knowledge


Frederic R. Kellogg


George Washington University

November 19, 2009


Abstract:     
This paper seeks to compare two separate schools of thought on the nature of knowledge as social inquiry. One is pragmatic fallibilism, associated with Charles S. Peirce and the early American pragmatists, with which I associate the legal philosophy of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The other is an approach to the sociology of scientific knowledge called finitism, associated with the Science Studies Unit at the University of Edinburgh, known for the ‘strong program’ characterizing the ‘Edinburgh School’ of science studies. Both legal and scientific knowledge might be viewed as forms of community inquiry, focusing on the primacy of cases and exemplars in the process of intersubjective classification, and on the dual role of concepts in both guiding the conduct of professional inquirers and framing and maintaining the coherence and consistency of both expert and general belief.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: philosophy of science, philosophy of law, jurisprudence, sociology of knowledge, pragmatism, fallibilism, finitism, Bloor, Durkheim, Feyerabend, Haack, Hesse, Holmes, Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, Peirce

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 21, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Kellogg, Frederic R., Law and Science as Forms of Inquiry: Toward a Comparison of Legal and Scientific Knowledge (November 19, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1509651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1509651

Contact Information

Frederic R. Kellogg (Contact Author)
George Washington University ( email )
2027 Q Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
United States
2025703517 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 362
Downloads: 125
Download Rank: 115,402
References:  21
Citations:  2

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.484 seconds