Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513354
 
 

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Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets


Alma Cohen


Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Peter Siegelman


University of Connecticut - School of Law

November 1, 2009

Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2010
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 651

Abstract:     
This paper reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage - risk prediction of adverse selection theory - that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage-risk correlation may be found in some pools of insurance policies but not in others. We also review the work on the disentangling of adverse selection and moral hazard and on learning by policyholders and insurers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: Insurance, adverse selection, moral hazard, accidents, claims, annuities, automobile insurance, health insurance, life insurance, risk-aversion, risk, coverage

JEL Classification: D82, G22

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: November 25, 2009 ; Last revised: February 15, 2010

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Alma and Siegelman, Peter, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (November 1, 2009). Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2010; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 651. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513354

Contact Information

Alma Cohen (Contact Author)
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 496-4099 (Phone)
(617) 812-0554 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Peter Siegelman
University of Connecticut - School of Law ( email )
65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
United States
860-570-5238 (Phone)
860-570-5242 (Fax)
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