Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513809
 
 

Citations



 


 



The Regulation of Entry


Simeon Djankov


New Economic School (NES)

Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


EDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute

2001

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship

Abstract:     
Examines the government regulations associatedwith the entry of new businesses into the market. Specifically, the proceduresand associated cost and time required to adhere to these regulations areevaluated for 85 countries in 1999. Data were collected from a variety of written publications provided by theindividual governments, discussions with representatives of governmentagencies, and reports from local law firms on entry regulation. The"standard" firm was considered, with such characteristics as: performsgeneral or commercial activities, operates in the country's largest city, andisexempt from industry-specific regulation. The results indicate that the average number of days needed to complete theentry regulation across the entire sample is 47, which equates to 47 percent ofgross domestic product (GDP) per capita. When the cost is examined by quartilesof GDP per capita in 1999, the average cost-per-capita-GDP ration for"rich" countries is only 10 percentwhile it is 108 percent in thepoorest countries. Additionally, the analysis shows that countries with a greater amount ofregulation tend to experience higher corruption, but the more strenuousregulations do not lead to better quality public goods. The findings areevaluated with respect to both the public interest theory and the tollbooththeory. (SRD)

Keywords: Corruption in government, Product quality, Public interest theory, Public choice theory, Tollbooth theory, Per capita income, Barriers to entry, Regulations, Legal procedures, Startups, Startup costs, Government

working papers series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: December 1, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Djankov, Simeon and La Porta, Rafael and Shleifer, Andrei and Lopez de Silanes, Florencio, The Regulation of Entry (2001). University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513809

Contact Information

Simeon Djankov (Contact Author)
New Economic School (NES) ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
HOME PAGE: http://www.nes.ru
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
EDHEC Business School ( email )
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
Nice, 06202
France
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07 (Phone)
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 355
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.360 seconds