Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513942
 
 

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Determinants of the Success of Remedy Offers: Evidence from European Community Mergers


Peter L. Ormosi


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy; Norwich Business School

November 26, 2009

CCP Working Paper 09-11

Abstract:     
This article proposes an empirical method for finding the determinants of the size of remedy offers relative to the level required by the European Commission in individual cases. Evidence is presented that merger characteristics, such as the size of the transaction, or the number of horizontal overlaps do not affect the probability of a remedy offer being successful. It is also shown that pre-merger expectations about merger-generated efficiencies increase the likelihood of successful offers. These findings are very important features of EC merger control, and a novelty in the existing literature. If parties are delay-averse, then the complexity of the case matters very little, as merging parties appear to be able to offer something outright acceptable for the Commission. This may lead to a counter-productive situation where less delay-averse mergers become more prone to offering too much, which can result in over-fixing the competition problem for those mergers where savings would be more likely.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: European Commission, mergers, merger remedies, saving expectations, efficiency defence, litigation, bargaining

JEL Classification: K21, K41, L49

working papers series


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Date posted: November 28, 2009 ; Last revised: January 7, 2010

Suggested Citation

Ormosi, Peter L., Determinants of the Success of Remedy Offers: Evidence from European Community Mergers (November 26, 2009). CCP Working Paper 09-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513942 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1513942

Contact Information

Peter L. Ormosi (Contact Author)
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom
Norwich Business School ( email )
Norwich
NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
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