Abstract

 
 

References (53)



 
 

Citations (16)



 


 



Evidence from Russiaare Private Banks More Efficient than Public Banks?


Alexei Karas


University College Roosevelt/Utrecht University; Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE)

Koen J. L. Schoors


Ghent University - Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE); Ghent University - Department of General Economics

Laurent Weill


University of Strasbourg - LaRGE Research Center (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie)


Economics of Transition, Vol. 18, Issue 1, pp. 209-244, January 2010

Abstract:     
We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and, surprisingly, that domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank’s environment, management’s risk preferences, the bank’s activity mix or size, the econometric approach, or the introduction of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: December 1, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Karas, Alexei, Schoors, Koen J. L. and Weill, Laurent, Evidence from Russiaare Private Banks More Efficient than Public Banks?. Economics of Transition, Vol. 18, Issue 1, pp. 209-244, January 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1514072 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2009.00364.x

Contact Information

Alexei Karas
University College Roosevelt/Utrecht University ( email )
P.O. Box 94
NL-4331 CB Middelburg
Middelburg, NL-4330 AB
Netherlands
+31 118-655517 (Phone)
+31 118-655508 (Fax)
Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE) ( email )
Hoveniersberg 24
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 92643480 (Phone)
+32 92643599 (Fax)
Koen J. L. Schoors
Ghent University - Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE) ( email )
Tweekerkenstraat 2
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 34 78 (Phone)
+32 9 265 35 99 (Fax)
Ghent University - Department of General Economics ( email )
Tweekerkenstraat 2
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 34 78 (Phone)
+32 9 264 35 99 (Fax)
Laurent Weill
University of Strasbourg - LaRGE Research Center (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) ( email )
61 Avenue de la Forêt Noire
F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex
France
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 150
Downloads: 3
References:  53
Citations:  16

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 1.204 seconds