An Economic Analysis of Cross-Listing Decisions and Their Impact on Earnings Quality
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
July 1, 2009
Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 61, pp. 310-330, July 2009
I examine the conditions under which entrepreneurs signal the high quality of their projects by cross-listing their firms in a jurisdiction with stricter enforcement of financial reporting regulation. I analyze the effect of these cross-listing decisions on international earnings quality, using a model of earnings management and financial reporting enforcement in which stricter enforcement makes accounting manipulation more costly. The analysis shows that firms can use cross-listing decisions to signal high quality projects even in the absence of listing costs. Cross-listing to a jurisdiction with stricter enforcement sometimes actually increases earnings management and generally leads to less earnings management among firms remaining in the domestic market.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21
Keywords: Analytical Accounting, Cross-Listing, Earnings Management, Earnings Quality, Enforcement
JEL Classification: G18, M48Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 3, 2009
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