Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516019
 


 



Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups


Roman M. Sheremeta


Chapman University

September 9, 2009

Korean Economic Review, 2011, 27, 5-32.

Abstract:     
This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, both strong and weak players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer within the group, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer within the group, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: contest, between-group competition, within-group competition, asymmetry, coordination, free-riding, experiments

JEL Classification: C71, C72, C91, C92, D72, H41

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Date posted: December 2, 2009 ; Last revised: September 24, 2012

Suggested Citation

Sheremeta, Roman M., Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups (September 9, 2009). Korean Economic Review, 2011, 27, 5-32.. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516019 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516019

Contact Information

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)
Chapman University ( email )
Orange, CA 92866
United States
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/romansheremeta/
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