Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516851
 


 



Understanding Collaborative Governance from the Structural Choice - Politics, IAD, and Transaction Cost Perspectives


Shui Yan Tang


University of Southern California

Daniel A. Mazmanian


University of Southern California - Sol Price School of Public Policy

March 1, 2010


Abstract:     
Defined as the process of establishing, steering, facilitating, operating, and monitoring cross-sectoral organizational arrangements to address public policy problems, collaborative governance has emerged as an institutional form valued by both professional and research audiences across a growing range of policy arenas. Practice has preceded theory, however, and we know far more about particulars than how to explain from broader theoretical perspectives the emergence and viability of collaborative governance. This paper explores how three well established and related theoretical perspectives — structural choice politics, the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, and transaction cost analysis — can be used to bring theoretical clarity to the phenomenon of collaborative governance. In addition to suggesting research propositions from the three perspectives, the paper also proposes directions for future research.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: collaboration, transaction costs, institutions, structural politics, governance

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Date posted: December 3, 2009 ; Last revised: April 6, 2010

Suggested Citation

Tang, Shui Yan and Mazmanian, Daniel A., Understanding Collaborative Governance from the Structural Choice - Politics, IAD, and Transaction Cost Perspectives (March 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516851 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516851

Contact Information

Shui Yan Tang (Contact Author)
University of Southern California ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
United States
2137400379 (Phone)
Daniel Mazmanian
University of Southern California - Sol Price School of Public Policy ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
United States
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