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The Informal Sector: An Equilibrium Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Brazil


Aureo De Paula


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Jose A. Scheinkman


Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

December 2, 2009

PIER Working Paper No. 09-044

Abstract:     
We test implications of a simple equilibrium model of informality using a survey of 48,000 small firms in Brazil. In the model, agent's ability to manage production differ and informal firms face a higher cost of capital and limitation on size, although these informal firms avoid tax payments. As a result, informal firms are managed by less able entrepreneurs, are smaller and employ a lower capital-labor ratio. When education is an imperfect proxy for ability, the model predicts that the interaction of the manager's education and formality is positively correlated with firm size. Using the model, we estimate that informal firms in our dataset faced at least 1.3 times the cost of capital of formal firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Informal Sector, Tax Avoidance, Brazil

JEL Classification: H2, H3, K4

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Date posted: December 7, 2009  

Suggested Citation

De Paula, Aureo and Scheinkman, Jose A., The Informal Sector: An Equilibrium Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Brazil (December 2, 2009). PIER Working Paper No. 09-044. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1517201

Contact Information

Aureo De Paula (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-1506 (Phone)
215- 573-2057 (Fax)
Jose A. Scheinkman
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
26 Prospect Avenue
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
609-258-4020 (Phone)
609-258-6419 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.princeton.edu/~joses

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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