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Institutional Block-Holdings of UK Firms: Do Corporate Governance Mechanisms Matter?


Arif Khurshed


University of Manchester - Manchester Business School, Division of Accounting Finance

Steve W. J. Lin


Florida International University (FIU) - School of Accounting

Mingzhu Wang


University of Manchester

December 7, 2009


Abstract:     
Using a sample of UK firms we find that institutional block-holding is negatively associated with directors’ ownership and is positively associated with board composition, suggesting that institutional block-holders regard directors’ ownership and board composition as substitute and complementary control mechanisms, respectively. We also show that UK institutional block-holders prefer smaller firms and firms with a shorter listing history. The presence of institutional block-holders is associated with smaller boards and lower trading liquidity. Finally, our results indicate that the investment preference of UK institutional block-holders varies with the level of their shareholding.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: institutional ownership, directors’ ownership, board structure, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G3, H39

working papers series


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Date posted: February 23, 2007 ; Last revised: December 20, 2009

Suggested Citation

Khurshed, Arif, Lin, Steve W. J. and Wang, Mingzhu, Institutional Block-Holdings of UK Firms: Do Corporate Governance Mechanisms Matter? (December 7, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1519953 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1519953

Contact Information

Arif Khurshed (Contact Author)
University of Manchester - Manchester Business School, Division of Accounting Finance ( email )
Crawford House
Oxford Road
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom
+44 0 161 275 4475 (Phone)
+44 0 161 275 4023 (Fax)
Steve W. J. Lin
Florida International University (FIU) - School of Accounting ( email )
University Park
11200 SW 8th Street
Miami, FL 33199
United States
Mingzhu Wang
University of Manchester ( email )
PO Box 88
Manchester, M60 1QD
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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