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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520696
 
 

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More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime


Steven Dean


Brooklyn Law School

December 8, 2009

Tulane Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 125, 2009

Abstract:     
Efforts to foster improved international tax cooperation have become preoccupied with tax harmonization. Deharmonization offers the possibility of harmony without uniformity. By exploring two examples of tax deharmonization in practice and considering the origins and limitations of tax harmonization, this Article brings the traditional emphasis on harmonization into question. It then makes the case that deharmonization - cooperation without uniformity - could provide a viable alternative. Achieving tax deharmonizations potential would require revisiting some of the most basic elements of our current international tax regime, particularly the benefits principle.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: tax, international, tax havens, tax cooperation, harmonization, tax treaties

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Date posted: December 10, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Dean, Steven, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime (December 8, 2009). Tulane Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 125, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520696

Contact Information

Steven Dean (Contact Author)
Brooklyn Law School ( email )
250 Joralemon Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States

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