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Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality?


Jong-Hag Choi


Seoul National University - College of Business Administration

Jeong-Bon Kim V


City University of Hong Kong

Yoonseok Zang


Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy

December 4, 2009


Abstract:     
This study examines whether and how audit quality proxied by the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals is associated with abnormal audit fees, that is, the difference between actual audit fee and the expected, normal level of audit fee. The results of various regressions reveal that the association between the two is asymmetric, depending on the sign of the abnormal audit fee. For observations with negative abnormal audit fees, there is no significant association between audit quality and abnormal audit fee. In contrast, abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality for observations with positive abnormal audit fees. Our findings suggest that auditors’ incentives to deter biased financial reporting differ systematically, depending on whether their clients pay more than or less than the normal level of audit fee. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Audit quality, abnormal audit fees, earnings management

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Date posted: December 15, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Choi, Jong-Hag, Kim, Jeong-Bon and Zang, Yoonseok, Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality? (December 4, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1521324

Contact Information

Jong Choi
Seoul National University - College of Business Administration ( email )
Seoul, 151-742
Korea
Jeong-Bon Kim V (Contact Author)
City University of Hong Kong ( email )
83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong
China
Yoonseok Zang
Singapore Management University - School of Accountancy ( email )
60 Stamford Road
Singapore 178900
Singapore

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