Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524327
 
 

References (35)



 


 



On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments


Richard R. W. Brooks


Yale University - Law School

Alexander Stremitzer


UCLA School of Law

October 26, 2011

American Law and Economics Review (Fall 2012) 14(2): 488-516
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 396

Abstract:     
A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) “affirm” the contract and seek money damages or specific performance; or (ii) “disaffirm” the contract with the remedy of rescission and restitution. This simple dichotomy of contract remedies applies broadly in both common law and civil law practice. We show here that this remedial regime allows parties to write simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: breach remedies, rescission, incomplete contracts, cooperative investments

JEL Classification: K12, L22, J41, C70

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 17, 2009 ; Last revised: April 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Brooks, Richard R. W. and Stremitzer, Alexander, On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments (October 26, 2011). American Law and Economics Review (Fall 2012) 14(2): 488-516; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 396. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524327 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1524327

Contact Information

Richard R. W. Brooks
Yale University - Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
Alexander Stremitzer (Contact Author)
UCLA School of Law ( email )
405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 90095-1476
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/all-faculty-profiles/professors/Pages/Alexander-Stremitzer.aspx
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,256
Downloads: 270
Download Rank: 61,458
References:  35

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.391 seconds