On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments
Richard R. W. Brooks
Yale University - Law School
UCLA School of Law
October 26, 2011
American Law and Economics Review (Fall 2012) 14(2): 488-516
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 396
A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) “affirm” the contract and seek money damages or specific performance; or (ii) “disaffirm” the contract with the remedy of rescission and restitution. This simple dichotomy of contract remedies applies broadly in both common law and civil law practice. We show here that this remedial regime allows parties to write simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29
Keywords: breach remedies, rescission, incomplete contracts, cooperative investments
JEL Classification: K12, L22, J41, C70Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 17, 2009 ; Last revised: April 1, 2013
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.266 seconds