Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act
Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
University of Chicago
NBER Working Paper No. w15598
Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46working papers series
Date posted: December 22, 2009
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