Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525776
 
 

References (43)



 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act


Petra Moser


New York University (NYU), Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Students; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alessandra Voena


University of Chicago

December 2009

NBER Working Paper No. w15598

Abstract:     
Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: December 22, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Moser, Petra and Voena, Alessandra, Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (December 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15598. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525776

Contact Information

Petra Moser (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU), Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Students ( email )
New York, NY
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Alessandra Voena
University of Chicago ( email )
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 257
Downloads: 29
References:  43
Citations:  7
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 1.157 seconds