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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525776
 
 

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Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act


Petra Moser


Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alessandra Voena


University of Chicago

December 2009

NBER Working Paper No. w15598

Abstract:     
Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

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Date posted: December 22, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Moser, Petra and Voena, Alessandra, Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (December 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15598. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525776

Contact Information

Petra Moser (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Alessandra Voena
University of Chicago ( email )
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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