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Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy ActPetra MoserStanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Alessandra VoenaUniversity of Chicago December 2009 NBER Working Paper No. w15598 Abstract: Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46 working papers seriesDate posted: December 22, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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