Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas
University of Erfurt
London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
University of Cologne
IZA Discussion Paper No. 4643
Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this "voting with feet" mechanism and find that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
Keywords: cooperation, social dilemmas, community choice, punishment, voting with feet
JEL Classification: C72, C92, H41working papers series
Date posted: December 22, 2009
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