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Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas


Ozgur Gurerk


University of Erfurt

Bernd Irlenbusch


London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Bettina Rockenbach


University of Cologne

December 2009

IZA Discussion Paper No. 4643

Abstract:     
Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this "voting with feet" mechanism and find that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: cooperation, social dilemmas, community choice, punishment, voting with feet

JEL Classification: C72, C92, H41

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Date posted: December 22, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Gurerk, Ozgur, Irlenbusch, Bernd and Rockenbach, Bettina , Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas (December 2009). IZA Discussion Paper No. 4643. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526073

Contact Information

Ozgur Gurerk (Contact Author)
University of Erfurt ( email )
Internationales Buro
Nordhaeuser Str. 63
D - 99089 Erfurt
Germany
Bernd Irlenbusch
London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 7840 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 6887 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/management/
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Bettina Rockenbach
University of Cologne ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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